Security Architecture: How Vaultmira Locks Your Files
Vaultmira does not lean on one clever trick. A few well-known building blocks each do one job, and together they decide who can open what. Here is every layer, in plain words, including the parts we cannot promise.
Vaultmira turns your drawing into a key with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (600,000 rounds and a random salt). That key unwraps a random 256-bit master key for the vault, and the master key seals every file, preview, file name and setting with AES-256-GCM, on your device, before anything is stored or backed up.
The Short Version
Think of a vault as a set of boxes inside boxes. Your drawing makes the key to the outer box. Inside it sits the vault’s master key, a random key that nobody chose and nobody can guess. The master key opens everything else: your photos, videos, documents, notes, their names, their previews, the list of what is in the vault and the vault’s settings.
Your backup phrase makes a second, separate key to the same master key, so you can get back in if you forget your drawing. Shares and the panic drawing each get keys of their own. Every key has one job, and no key is ever stored in readable form.
Layer 1: Your Drawing Becomes a Key
You draw on a 5×5 grid of dots. A drawing needs at least 6 dots and at least one change of direction, and dots you pass straight over are added for you, the way phone pattern locks work. The order of the dots is turned into bytes and fed into PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 600,000 rounds.
PBKDF2 is a deliberately slow recipe. You pay its cost once each time you unlock, which takes a moment. Someone trying to guess drawings pays it again for every single guess. 600,000 rounds of HMAC-SHA256 is in line with what current public password-storage guidance recommends for PBKDF2.
A random 32-byte salt is mixed in. The salt is not a secret. Its job is to make guesses prepared for one person useless for anyone else. Your devices share the same salt, so the same drawing opens the same vault on your iPhone, your iPad or a new phone.
Layer 2: Separate Keys for Separate Jobs
From the key your drawing makes, Vaultmira derives smaller keys with HKDF-SHA256, each labelled for one purpose. Because each label gives a completely different key, one key can never be used in another key’s place.
- “wrap” opens the vault’s sealed master key.
- “rescue” is made from your backup phrase instead, and opens a second sealed copy of the same master key.
- “panic-wrap” belongs to a panic drawing (Pro) and opens the record of which vault to show.
- “share-files” is made from a one-time share phrase and seals the copies of files you share (Pro).
Vaultmira also makes short fingerprints (HMAC-SHA256) from those keys to name things on disk: “vault-id” for a vault’s folder, “words-id” to find a vault from its backup phrase, “panic-id” for a panic drawing and “share-id” for a share. The folder names are random-looking letters and numbers. Nothing on disk says which drawing, or which person, a vault belongs to.
Layer 3: A Random Master Key per Vault
When a vault is created, the app makes a fresh, random 256-bit master key. Your drawing never encrypts your files directly. It only unwraps this key. That has two big benefits:
- Changing your drawing is instant. Only the small wrapped key is sealed again. Your files do not need to be encrypted all over again.
- Recovery does not weaken the vault. Your backup phrase opens its own sealed copy of the master key, so it never needs to know your drawing.
A phrase made for you has nine randomly picked words, about 67 bits of chance. If you type your own, it must be at least six words. Small words like “a” and “the” are ignored, so getting them wrong does not lock you out.
Layer 4: AES-256-GCM on Everything Inside
Every file is sealed with AES-256-GCM, the Advanced Encryption Standard with a 256-bit key in Galois/Counter Mode, using Apple’s CryptoKit. The same master key also seals:
- Previews, the small pictures in your grid.
- The index, the list of what is in the vault, including file names, dates and kinds.
- Vault details: the vault’s name, folder names, share list and settings.
- Your backup phrase, so Settings can show it to you while the vault is open.
GCM does two things at once. It keeps the data secret, and it adds a 16-byte tag that acts like a tamper seal. If even one bit of a sealed file is changed, by an attacker or a damaged disk, the seal fails and the file will not open, instead of showing you something altered.
Each seal uses a fresh random 12-byte nonce (a number used once), so sealing the same photo twice never gives the same result. Big files such as videos are sealed in 4 MB pieces. Each piece has its own nonce and tag, and its number plus a “last piece” mark are sealed in as well, so pieces that are missing, swapped or cut off are caught.
What Lives Where
- On your device: only sealed files with random names, written with iOS Data Protection “complete”, which keeps them unreadable while the device is locked.
- In the Keychain: only the drawing salt, which is not a secret. A copy stays on this device, a copy syncs through iCloud Keychain, and a copy sits in your private iCloud so a new device can use the same salt. No vault key is ever put in the Keychain.
- In your iCloud: if backup is on, the already-sealed files are uploaded as they are to your own private iCloud database. Apple stores scrambled bytes and random names, though like any cloud service it can see how much the app stores and when records change. Panic files are never uploaded.
- On our side: nothing. There is no Vaultmira server, no account and no analytics. Settings says “Data we collect: None”.
We never receive your drawing, your backup phrase or any key, so we cannot open your vaults and cannot reset access for anyone, including you.
If you lose both your drawing and your backup phrase, that vault cannot be opened. That is the price of a design with no back door, and we think it is worth saying clearly.
When You Lock
Vaultmira locks the moment you leave the app or tap the lock button. When it locks:
- the open vault’s keys and file list are dropped from the app’s memory, along with the preview pictures it was holding;
- readable copies made so you could view a file, play a video or share a copy are deleted;
- files still waiting to be added are thrown away;
- the app switcher shows a lock instead of your files.
Readable copies are also cleared every time the app starts, in case it was closed in the middle of something.
ScreenShield: Black Screenshots
iOS has no switch that lets an app block screenshots. But it does leave the contents of password fields out of every screenshot and screen recording. Vaultmira places its whole window inside that protected layer, so captures of the app come out black. The one exception is the page that shows your backup phrase, where a screenshot may be exactly what you want.
What We Cannot Promise
Good security is honest about its edges. Here are ours:
- A simple drawing is easier to guess. PBKDF2 makes each guess slow, but it cannot make a predictable shape unpredictable. Use more dots and more turns.
- An unlocked, compromised device is a different problem. While a vault is open, its key and files are in the app’s memory. Malware with deep access to an unlocked device is beyond what any app can fully defend against.
- Memory cleanup has limits. We zero the raw output of the key function after use and drop the vault’s keys on lock, but Swift and iOS manage memory themselves, so we do not claim every copy is erased the instant you lock.
- Deleting is not shredding. On flash storage, no app can promise a deleted file’s physical blocks are wiped at once. What protects you is that vault files are always sealed.
Frequently Asked Questions
What encryption does Vaultmira use?
AES-256-GCM for files, previews, file names, the vault index and settings. Keys come from your drawing or backup phrase through PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 600,000 rounds, and HKDF-SHA256 gives each job its own key.
Can Vaultmira or Apple see my files?
No. We never receive your drawing, phrase or keys, and there is no Vaultmira server. Apple stores only already-sealed files in your private iCloud if backup is on.
Why does unlocking take a moment?
That pause is PBKDF2 doing 600,000 rounds of work. You wait once per unlock. Someone guessing has to wait that long for every guess.
Is my master key stored in the Keychain?
No. The master key is stored only in sealed form, inside the vault, and can be opened only with your drawing or your backup phrase. The Keychain holds just the drawing salt, which is not a secret.
Does changing my drawing re-encrypt all my files?
No. Your files are sealed with the vault’s random master key. A new drawing only seals that master key again, so it is quick, and your old drawing stops working.
What happens if I lose both my drawing and my backup phrase?
That vault cannot be opened, by you or by us. There is no back door. Keep your backup phrase somewhere safe.
See the Layers at Work
Draw a shape, add a file, and every layer described here protects it on your device. No account needed.
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